We Have Met the Imbeciles and They Are Us: The Courts and Citizens with Mental Retardation by Killenbeck, Mark R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 4 Article 6
1986
We Have Met the Imbeciles and They Are Us: The
Courts and Citizens with Mental Retardation
Mark R. Killenbeck
University of Nebraska College of Law, mkillenb@uark.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation




We Have Met the Imbeciles and They
Are Us: The Courts and Citizens
with Mental Retardation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 768
II. The Supreme Court and Citizens with Mental
Retardation: Law or Indiscretion? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  774
III. Lawyers, Courts, and Professionals: Strangers in a
Strange Land .............................................. 790
IV. Conclusion ................................................ 806
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 1983, the Senate Subcommittee on the Handi-
capped convened to determine if the United States Department of Jus-
tice was meeting its statutory responsibility to protect the rights of
citizens who were confined in this nation's institutions. During the
hearing, Senator Lowell Weicker questioned William Bradford Reyn-
olds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division:
Senator Weicker: If indeed one of these persons' life could be snuffed out in
the next hour, and you know about it, do you have the power to go in there
and make sure that that life will not be snuffed out? Do you have the author-
ity right now to save that life?
Mr Reynolds: I think that if you know in advance that somebody is going to-
your situation is, if you know in advance that somebody is going to snuff out a
life, in the next hour? I would-I am not sure what-I would have to look
into that, whether the Federal Government is in a position to go in in advance
on that.1
These statements make harsh reading. An Assistant Attorney
General of the United States found himself unable, or unwilling, to
declare that this nation would come to the assistance of a citizen
whose life was in peril.2 For those present-or who heard the re-
1. Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act- Institutional Care and
Services for Retarded Citizens, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Handi-
capped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 52 (1983).
2. Mr. Reynolds attempted to rationalize his response by stressing that he felt it was
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broadcast that evening on National Public Radio-the dialogue
presented a scene that was nothing less than incredible. Mr. Reynolds
required a protracted period of time to formulate even this inadequate
response, and during the lengthy silences that punctuated his re-
marks, one was compelled to question the sincerity of this nation's
commitment to the rights and interests of citizens with mental
disabilities.
Senator Weicker and his colleagues called Mr. Reynolds to task for
effectively eviscerating an important federal civil rights statute.3
There were political implications in the hearing,4 and the issues posed
are admittedly complex.5 Nevertheless, in the face of a clear Congres-
sional mandate to protect the rights of citizens confined to institutions,
a question of "authority." Id. (noting possible recourse under criminal statutes).
But when presented with a hypothetical that placed a human life at risk, one
would expect an official sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of this nation
to at least respond that he would definitely do something, even if it were only call
the local authorities.
3. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1982)). CRIPA, as the Act is known, was
proposed and passed in response to court decisions holding that the federal gov-
ernment lacked the authority to bring actions on its own to protect the rights of
institutional residents. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)
("Despite the proven effectiveness of the Department's efforts, its litigation pro-
gram stands threatened by two recent Federal court decisions."). See infra note
5.
4. Senator Weicker, a liberal Republican and Watergate veteran, was clearly predis-
posed to be at odds with the administration. Any attempt to use this to color his
hostility toward Departmental efforts under CRIPA would be a mistake. Senator
Weicker has consistently been an articulate and compassionate spokesman for
the rights of the disabled. Senator Weicker was, of course, not alone in his criti-
cisms of the Department and Mr. Reynolds. See, e.g., Cook, The Substantive Due
Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Clients, 7 MENTAL DISABILTY L. REP. 346
(1983); Thornton, New Policy on Mental Patient Rights Upsets Lawyers, Health
Community, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1982, at A2, col 1; Washington Council of Law-
yers, Reagan Civil Rights: The First Twenty Months 80-102 (1982). For a detailed
critique of the administration's civil rights posture in the area of employment
discrimination, school desegregation, and voting rights, see Days, Turning Back
the Clock- The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 309 (1984).
5. For example, during the protracted life of the Pennhurst case the courts ad-
dressed questions involving the spending power, see Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) [Pennhurst 1], and the eleventh amend-
ment, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) [Pen-
nhurst 11]. Important jurisdictional issues were also raised as a result of the
Justice Department's involvement in litigation concerning institutional condi-
tions. The Department's presence in the Wyatt litigation was at the invitation of
the court. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 786 (M.D. Ala. 1971). In subse-
quent cases, however, the Department initiated action on its own, and state chal-
lenges of its authority to do so were sustained. See United States v. Mattson, C.A.
No. 74-138 BU (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), all'd, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979);




the record of the administration was then and remains now one of
reluctant and sporadic activity.6
This is perhaps to be expected; "states' rights" overtones arise
when questions are posed about conditions in public institutions. But
for those familiar with the manner in which the law has recently
treated citizens with mental disabilities, the results are far from sur-
prising. The courts-and presumably the society whose values they
mirror-have found it increasingly difficult to accommodate the asser-
tion of a right to basic human dignity by those whom many are prone
to dismiss as "morons," "retardates," or "imbeciles." 7
This was not always the case. In a series of landmark decisions,
federal courts recognized a variety of constitutional and statutory
claims. In Alabama,8 New York, 9 and Pennsylvania,10 for example,
6. For a thoughtful and detailed critique of the Department's efforts, see Dinerstein,
The Absence of Justice, 63 NEB. L. REV. 680 (1984).
7. Citizens with mental retardation and their advocates react to these words in
much the same way that blacks respond to the term "nigger." Yet the use of
these and similar derogatory labels persists. See, e.g., C. LEBARON, GENTLE VEN-
GEANCE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST YEAR AT HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL (1981).
Mr. LeBaron, in an ill-fated attempt to make much of his "humane and caring
nature," stresses his work with retarded citizens at one of the institutions that
received individuals placed from the infamous Willowbrook. Yet he persisted in
referring to these individuals as "retardates." The courts also continue to use this
terminology. See, e.g., Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191,
197 (5th Cir. 1984) ("we conclude that... mental retardates are not a suspect
class"), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
8. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afffd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). For an overview of the theories devel-
oped and adopted in Wyatt, see Johnson, Observation: The Constitution and the
Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903, 908-10 (1976); Developments in the
Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974); Note,
The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). For a negative commentary on the implications
of this and other institutional reform cases for state rights, see Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978). For a general treatment of the
issues raised, see THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW (M. Kindred,
J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer eds. 1976); Symposium: Mentally Retarded Peo-
ple and the Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 541-829 (1979).
9. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (the Willowbrook case). For an excellent, detailed, and compas-
sionate history of that case, see D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK
WARS: A DECADE OF STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (1984).
10. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on
remand 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984),final settlement ap-
proved, 610 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The literature spawned by the Pen-
nhurst case is voluminous. One of the more interesting treatments is Burt,
Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW RE-
FORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 265 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985). For the views of the attor-
neys who brought the action, see Ferleger & Scott, Rights and Dignity: Congress,
The Supreme Cour and People with Disabilities after Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG.
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district and appellate courts found that citizens with mental retarda-
tion had judicially cognizable rights and fashioned sweeping relief
designed to protect those entitlements. Indeed, in the pre-Youngberg
era, only one reported decision failed to recognize one of the corner-
stones of this emerging body of law, a constitutional right to treat-
ment, and it was reversed."l
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has cut back or qualified to
the point of extinction many of these hard fought victories. The situa-
tion is one of compelling irony. The Court has acknowledged that the
"mere presence" of a mental disability does not justify deprivation of
basic constitutional rights.12 Yet time and again this same Court has,
either directly or by implication, denied to citizens with mental retar-
dation the means to overcome the barriers that society has imposed
between them and a full and productive life.13
This is understandable, at least in one very narrow sense. Institu-
tional reform litigation has had a positive impact; institutional popula-
tions have declined, and conditions at many institutions have
improved. Unfortunately, this progress has tended to exacerbate
rather than ameliorate the situation. Both judicial and social outrage
have diminished as the conditions litigated became less heinous. More
significantly, many of the so-called "higher functioning" individuals,
generally those categorized as individuals with "mild" or "moderate"
L. REv. 327 (1983); Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Intitutionalization: The Promise of
the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979).
11. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (institutional resident has judi-
cially cognizable liberty interests only in physical safety and freedom from un-
necessary restraint). The solitary pre-Youngberg case was Burnham v.
Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). An argument can be made that
the right to treatment was rejected in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). That court did, however,
find an alternate ground for vindicating the claims raised (eighth amendment
protection from harm), and subsequently indicated that "no bright line" sepa-
rated that standard from the right to treatment. New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Since Youngberg,
however, a number of courts have either rejected the doctrine outright or have
taken a crabbed approach to the rights of citizens with retardation. See, e.g., Phil-
lips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Youngberg teaches that, at
the most, the class members were entitled to minimally adequate training"); Doe
by Roe v. Gaughan, 617 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Mass. 1985) (no per se constitu-
tional right to treatment; entitled only to minimally adequate care and freedom
from restraint). The parsing of Youngberg has not, however, always been an ex-
ercise in clarity. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (plurality
opinion and three concurring opinions with different interpretations).
12. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). The actual ruling in O'Connor
is, however, quite narrow. See infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
13. The major decisions are Pennhurst I & II, Youngberg, and City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). For a discussion of these cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 31-91.
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mental retardation, have been placed in community settings.14 Those
remaining in institutions tend, accordingly, to be individuals with "se-
vere" or "profound" mental retardation, often complicated by the
presence of other disabling conditions. As a result, the dialogue has
undergone a subtle but significant transformation. The issue is no
longer whether citizens with mental retardation, as a broad class, have
judicially cognizable rights. Rather, the question in a very real sense
is whether society is willing to recognize the very humanity of those
individuals that it characterizes as having "severe" or "profound"
mental retardation.
The immediate results have been both predictable and distressing.
A growing conflict between good intentions and judicial restraint has
become evident as lower courts struggle with challenges to institu-
tional conditions and public prejudices. Citizens with mental retarda-
tion and their advocates argue that they are simply seeking to secure
those rights and privileges that inhere in their status as citizens. State
officials, in turn, espouse fidelity to this precept, even as they gaze
with alarm upon the political, economic, and social implications that
meaningful vindication of these rights would entail. Caught in the
middle, many courts now fashion decisions that are both compelled by
the current state of the law and tragic in their implications. Citizens
with mental retardation are, for example, entitled to "safe conditions
and freedom from undue restraint."15 What the courts seem reluctant
to provide is any indication that the lives thus "protected" can ulti-
mately be made meaningful.
The characterizations and approaches employed are invariably pos-
itive, particularly when citizens with mental retardation challenge
either the fact or the circumstances of their commitment to public in-
stitutions. A typical defense of institutionalization will, for example,
assert that "[a]n institution of over a thousand residents can be an im-
personal, overcrowded, inhuman place, but it also can be a happy com-
munity with the pulsing life of a prosperous village, where everybody
can find what he needs. 1 6 Proponents of similar treatment of blacks
14. The terms "mild," "moderate," "severe," and "profound" are the most widely
used, and abused, means of describing individuals with mental retardation. This
"level of retardation" approach is, however, of very limited value, and has been
either abandoned or integrated into a more comprehensive system in many states.
See in.fra text accompanying notes 166-205.
15. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245 (2d Cir.
1984). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
131-46.
16. Egg-Benes, Integration of the Mentally Retarded in Society, in 1 RESEARCH TO
PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 351-52 (P. Mittler ed. 1977), quoted in Brief
for Congress of Advocates for the Retarded as Amicus Curiae at 8, Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter C.A.R. Brief].
For a discussion and critique of the arguments in favor of institutionalization, and
[Vol. 65:768
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would, of course, be immediately decried as insensitive racists.17 In-
deed, even the most hardened states' rights activists would hesitate to
defend actions impinging on the rights of blacks, women, or other dis-
advantaged groups on the basis of creating a "pulsing village." These
arguments are, however, routinely tolerated-even applauded-when
it is a citizen with severe or profound mental retardation who is being
segregated from society.
In his colloquy with Senator Weicker, Mr. Reynolds espoused the
position of a Department of "Justice" that is each day moving farther
away from its historic role as an advocate for the rights of citizens with
mental retardation. The Department has gone to great lengths to
cloak its revised approach in intellectually respectable terms: the
question becomes one of federal "power," rather than of a particular
vision of the rights and characteristics of citizens with mental retarda-
tion. The problem is that there was a time when the government did
not feel compelled to seek refuge behind this transparent veneer of
federalism and states' rights. Individuals confined to this nation's in-
stitutions were, whatever else might be said, citizens who merited the
compassion and protection of their government.' 8
When presented in the stark terms posed by Senator Weicker, the
full implications of what Mr. Reynolds and his colleagues now espouse
strike us, justifiably, as intolerable. As will become evident, however,
the Department's position is an increasingly popular one. The purpose
of this Article is to ask how it is that we have reached this juncture,
and to frame the choices that we now face.
the manner in which institutional proponents view citizens with mental retarda-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 166-210.
17. The obvious exception is for those who somehow believe that we should either
tolerate or support, "constructively" or otherwise, South Africa and apartheid.
18. Compare Brief for the United States at 11, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Developmental Disabilities Act a "clear statement
of individual rights"), and Brief for the United States at 46-47, Halderman v. Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (under equal protection
clause, state must provide services in least restrictive environment), with Brief
for the United States at 32, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984) (arguing for Youngberg "deference to professional judgments"
standard "for the review of statutory challenges to such decisions"), and Fourth
Brief for the United States at 7-8, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564 & 78-1602 (3d Cir., on remand from Supreme Court) ("invol-
untarily committed mental health patients have no substantive constitutional
right to habilitation beyond the limited right to training recognized in Romeo"),
and id. at 9 n.3 ("We agree with the observation ... that placement in small
community facilities is not appropriate for all mentally retarded persons.") (cita-
tion omitted).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND CITIZENS WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION: LAW OR INDISCRETION?
As a society, we like to believe that we have long since passed the
point where the eugenics movement typifies our thinking about citi-
zens with mental disabilities.1 9 As one facet of this "caring and com-
passionate" community, our courts in particular strive to banish the
spectres of an age within which Justice Holmes' strident and ill-fated
decree in Buck v. Bell served as the legal touchstone for assessing pro-
grams and services for citizens with mental retardation.2 0
Our national posture regarding the rights and capabilities of citi-
zens with mental retardation is, arguably, straightforward and sympa-
thetic. Congress has declared that "[o]ne measure of a nation's
civilization is the quality of treatment it provides persons entrusted to
its care."2 1 Unfortunately, a majority of the current members of the
Supreme Court apparently harbor a constricted view of both the capa-
bilities of citizens with mental retardation and their rights. Over the
last six years, the Court has decided four cases directly implicating the
rights of citizens with mental retardation. In each instance, the Court
has issued opinions within which a superficial empathy for the rights
of citizens with retardation is belied by the practical implications of
the Court's ultimate disposition of the case. 22
19. For a general history of the eugenics movement, see S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE
OF MAN (1981); D. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES (1968). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the manner in which this society has treated citizens with
mental disabilities, see D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASY-
LUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); D. ROTEMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(1971). Past views were not, however, abandoned because society simply saw the
error of its ways. See, e.g., S. GOULD, supra, at 22 ("death knell of the old eugenics
in America ... sounded more by Hitler's particular use of once-favored argu-
ments for sterilization and racial purification than by advances in genetic
knowledge").
20. The reference is obviously to the ill-fated statement that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In an interesting
recent article on this judicial lowpoint, Professor Lombardo establishes that the
"true goal" of the attorney for Carrie Buck "was to help secure legislative and
judicial endorsement for a practice he had long supported." Lombardo, Three
Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 62
(1985). It would, however, be a mistake to assume that either the Court or Justice
Holmes would have reached any other result. See Dudziak, Oliver Wendell
Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law,
71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 856, 859 (1986) (Holmes "knew which side was right," and
"asserted the truth of his position and called upon his reader to believe him").
21. S. Rep. No. 416, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 787, 788.
22. The Court has also limited the scope of the protections incorporated in federal
legislation guaranteeing the right to a "free appropriate public education" to all
citizens with disabilities. See, e.g., Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (if individual receives "some educational benefit," intent
[Vol. 65:768
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In three of these cases, the Court dealt with conditions and prac-
tices atthe Pennhurst State School and Hospital in Pennsylvania, an
institution that even the state defendants "admitted... does not pres-
ently meet minimum standards for the habilitation of its residents."23
The environment was, at best, appalling.
the living areas do not meet minimal professional standards for cleanli-
ness.... Outbreaks of pinworms and infectiuous disease are common....
[Miost toilet areas do not have towels, soap, or toilet paper, and the bathroom
facilities are often filthy and in a state of disrepair. Obnoxious odors and ex-
cessive noise permeate the atmosphere .... Moreover, the noise level in the
day rooms is often so high that many residents simply stop speaking... [D]iet
control... is almost impossible. ... Injuries to residents by other residents,
and through self-abuse, are common.
2 4
Physical restraints were "used as control measures in lieu of adequate
staffing,"25 and there was "some staff abuse of residents. '26 In the
case of Nicholas Romeo, whose "treatment" consisted principally of
prolonged periods during which he was "shackled to a bed or chair,"27
it [wa]s not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, [he] was injured on
over seventy occasions. These injuries were both self-inflicted and the result
of attacks by other residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive
behavior. The injuries included a broken arm, a fractured finger, injuries to
the sexual organs, human bite marks, lacerations, black eyes, and scratches.
Moreover, some of [Romeo's] injuries became infected, either from inadequate
medical attention or from contact with human excrement that the Pennhurst
staff failed to clean up.2 8
In its Pennhurst decisions then, the Court dealt with an environ-
ment that was far removed from the "pulsing village" that institu-
tional proponents defend with such vigor. The distinction is critical,
for even though the Court itself found the conditions at Pennhurst
distressing,29 it nevertheless strove mightily to avoid addressing many
of the fundamental questions that led the district court to conclude
that "minimally adequate habilitation cannot be provided in an insti-
tution such as Pennhurst."30
In Pennhurst I, the Court assessed the impact of a federal statute
that arguably established a federal substantive right to "appropriate
of Congress met). But see Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371
(1984) (arguably broad definition of "support services" required to keep a handi-
capped child in school).
23. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 1308 (footnote and citations omitted).
25. Id. at 1306 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1309.
27. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 n.22 (3d Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 155.
29. See infra note 38 and text accompanying notes 195-96.
30. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (emphasis added).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:768
treatment" in the "least restrictive environment." 31 The Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act included a series
of Congressional "findings," 32 among which was the declaration that
these citizens have a right to "treatment, services, and habilitation...
designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and
... provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's per-
sonal liberty."33 The Court agreed that the Act "establishes a national
policy to provide better care and treatment to the retarded and creates
funding incentives to induce the States to do so."34 But the Court
found no basis for imposing that obligation on the states. Concluding
that the Act was passed by Congress pursuant to its spending power,
the Court found that the purpose of the Act was to "'assist'" the
states, 35 and that it "would be attributing far too much to Congress if
we held that [the Act] required the States, at their own expense, to
provide certain kinds of treatment."36
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found a
substantive right to treatment grounded in state law.37 Once again,
the state appealed; once again, the Court reversed.38 In this instance,
however, the Court's decision was arguably divorced from a considera-
31. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 10 (1981).
32. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
§ 201, 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975).
33. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1982)).
34. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
35. Id. at 18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). While it is beyond
the scope of this Article to do so, a strong case can be made that the Act was more
than a simple exercise of the spending power.
36. Id. at 31-32. There is a certain irony in the fact that the 1975 amendments to the
statute, supra note 32, both added the Congressional findings and, by shifting the
overall focus of the Act from planning and advocacy to categorical aid, ultimately
provided the basis for the Court's determination that "nothing suggests that Con-
gress intended the Act to be something other than a typical funding statute."
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (footnote
omitted). Prior to 1975, the Act did contain provisions for categorical grants. See
42 U.S.C. § 6061 (1976). But the major emphasis was on coordinated planning and
advocacy efforts designed to protect the rights of the disabled. See Developmental
Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-517, 84 Stat. 1323 (1970). Dissatisfied with the diversion of funds to these pur-
poses and away from their own programs, groups representing the disabled (in-
cluding the National Association for Retarded Citizens) actively supported the
changes. See, e.g., Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Ac4
1974: Hearings on S. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974) (prepared
statement of Nat. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens).
37. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en
banc).
38. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Whatever else
might be said about this decision and Pennhurst I, the Court recognized that
"'[c]onditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often
physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the "ha-
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tion of the actual rights of retarded citizens. Neither the particular
needs and interests of Terri Lee Halderman, nor the conditions at
Pennhurst itself were at issue. Rather, the question presented was
whether the federal courts could "enjoin petitioner state institutions
and state officials on the basis of this state law."3 9
This formulation of the issues was not achieved without objection.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens noted pointedly that "[t]his
case has illuminated the character of an institution,"40 one within
which "at every stage.., petitioners have conceded... fails to provide
even minimally adequate habilitation for its residents."41 Justice Ste-
vens also stressed that the court of appeals had examined the state law
issue at the express command of the Supreme Court,42 and that
"[r]espondents do not complain about the conduct of the State of
Pennsylvania-it is Pennsylvania's commands which they seek to en-
force. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst run the way Penn-
sylvania envisioned that it be run."43 The majority remained
unconvinced. As it tacitly conceded, every court that considered the
issues found conditions at Pennhurst inadequate.44 Nevertheless, the
majority narrowed the question, and found only that, pursuant to the
eleventh amendment, "federal courts lacked jurisdiction" to entertain
suits of this nature.45
The third Pennhurst case, which actually preceded Pennhurst I,
did deal directly with the conditions at that troubled institution. In
Youngberg v. Romeo46 the Court considered a liability claim filed
against three administrators. The issue was whether Nicholas Romeo
had "substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom
from bodily restraints; and (iii) training or 'habilitation.' "47 Drawing
on established principles, the Court quickly affirmed the first two
claims. 48 It found the third claim "more troubling,"49 however, and in
bilitation" of the retarded."' Id. at 92-93 (quoting Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. 1, 7
(1981)).
39. Id. at 124-25.
40. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined this dissent.
41. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (the court of appeals "merely obeyed the in-
structions of this Court").
43. Id. at 163-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 92-96 (tracing the history of the case and noting the lower court findings).
45. Id. at 124-25. For a criticism of the majority's treatment of the eleventh amend-
ment issues, see Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pen-
nhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
46. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
47. Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 315-16 (liberty interests similar to those of convicted criminals "survive in-
voluntary commitment").
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a very real sense it ultimately avoided the underlying issues. The
Court determined that Romeo "enjoys constitutionally protected in-
terests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonre-
strictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required
by these interests."50 It emphasized, however, that "[b]ecause the
facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients vary
widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the
case before a court."'' 5 Since Romeo appeared to seek only training
that would reduce his aggressive behaviors, "[i]n view of the kinds of
treatment sought... and the evidence of record, we need go no fur-
ther in this case."52
The Court then considered the liability issue. Stressing that the
liberty interests involved "are not absolute," 53 the Court attempted to
strike a balance between the interests of the institutional resident and
those of the state. In determining what constituted "reasonable" con-
ditions and training, the Court articulated a "professional judgment"
standard:
[Tihe decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may
be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment.5 4
This "presumption of correctness" was, however, clearly predicated
upon and influenced by the question of liability. The Court accepted
as given that institutions for citizens with mental retardation would,
albeit "unfortunately," be "overcrowded and understaffed."-5 Having
done so, it then attempted to fashion a standard that would insulate all
but the most egregious professional decisions from judicial scrutiny.
The logic of the Court's position was simple: if institutions like Penn-
hurst were to "continue to function," then their "administrators, and
particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages."56
The Court's most recent foray into the realm of state treatment of
49. Id. at 316.
50. Id. at 324.
51. Id. at 319 n.25.
52. Id. at 319. The validity of the Court's judgment regarding the characterization of
Romeo's claims and the remedy sought is subject to question. See infra note 101
and accompanying text.
53. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1982).
54. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 324. Why this has to be so-or should be constitutionally permissible-is
unclear.
56. Id. at 324-25. Youngberg has also provoked a number of commentaries. The best
of these is Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE
L.J. 455 (1984), which places Youngberg within the wider contexts of the Court's
response to the rights of both blacks and the disabled.
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citizens with mental retardation came when it explored the constitu-
tionality of a Cleburne, Texas zoning ordinance. The court of appeals
for the fifth circuit had determined that while citizens with mental
retardation "are not a suspect class, they do share enough of the char-
acteristics of a suspect class to warrant heightened scrutiny."57 The
ordinance, both on its face and as applied, did not in the court's opin-
ion "further any important governmental interest."s8 Accordingly, it
failed to pass constitutional muster.
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
citizens with mental retardation constituted a "quasi-suspect class."59
It stressed that these individuals are "different, immutably so, in rele-
vant respects, and the states' interest in dealing with and providing for
them is plainly a legitimate one."60 Accordingly, some distinctions
were both appropriate and constitutional. The Court also found that
the variety of state and federal laws passed to protect and assist citi-
zens with mental retardation "belies a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the
judiciary."61 It also asserted that this "legislative response, which
could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, ne-
gates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers." 62 Finally, the plurality observed that if this "large and
amorphous class" were deemed suspect, it would be "difficult to find a
principled way to distinguish" them from a "variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others,
who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and
57. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191,197 (5th Cir. 1984). The
plaintiffs-appellants were represented by Advocacy, Inc., an agency established
by and partially funded through the Developmental Disabilities Act, which condi-
tions receipt of the state formula grant funds on the establishment of state "pro-
tection and advocacy agency" with "the authority to pursue legal, administrative,
and other appropriate remedies to insure the protection of the rights of... per-
sons who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation within the State. .. "
42 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(1) & (2)(A) (1982). The statutory grant is to protect the rights
of all developmentally disabled persons in the state, not simply those receiving
assistance in programs funded under the Act. This is of particular interest given
the Court's narrow construction of the Act in Pennhurst I.
58. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1984).
59. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255-56 (1985). The
plurality opinion was written by Justice White and joined by Justices Rehnquist,
Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed a
concurring opinion, arguing against the assumption that cases such as this could
fit the "well-defined standards" implied by a three-tiered analysis. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
60. Id. at 3256.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3257.
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who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the pub-
lic at large."63
Citizens with mental retardation were not, however, "entirely un-
protected from invidious discrimination." 64 Employing the less exact-
ing rational relationship test, the Court found that the ordinance, "as
applied," failed to pass constitutional muster. The record revealed
that the city required a special use permit for group homes but not for
"apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the
like."65 These other congregate living facilities were indistinguishable
from group homes for citizens with mental retardation, and the vari-
ous rationales advanced by the city, which included such weighty mat-
ters as "mere negative attitudes" and location of the home on a five
hundred year flood plain, were found wanting.66 The denial of the
permit in this instance "appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded,"67 and could not be countenanced.
Certain initial conclusions about the Court's treatment of these
cases seem inescapable. A substantial argument can be made that the
Court misread both the express language and history of the Develop-
mental Disabilities Act in Pennhurst J,68 and the strong dissenting
opinions in Pennhurst II attest to significant differences of opinion
63. Id. at 3257-58. For a critique of these rationales, see infra text accompanying
notes 120-22.
64. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1985).
65. Id. at 3260.
66. Id. at 3259-60.
67. Id at 3260.
68. For example, the Court stressed that the Act was designed to "assist" the states.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 6000(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). That language deals, however, only
with the overall purpose of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(1) (1982). The "spe-
cific purpose" of the formula grant program, id. at § 6000(b)(2), is to "make
grants ... to establish model programs, to demonstrate innovative habilitation
techniques, and to train ... personnel...." Id. at § 6000(b)(2)(C). As the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stressed, "[t]he developmental
disabilities program itself provides only approximately 1 percent of all the funds
available from Federal, state, and local sources for services of various kinds to the
developmentally disabled." H.R. Rep. No. 94-58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted
in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 919, 924. Accordingly, the "program...
must have its impact through improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the
use of the rest of the available funds." Id. (emphasis added). The Act may or
may not have been merely "hortatory"; Congress clearly contemplated, however,
that it would redirect and focus the allocation of both federal and state resources
in line with the overarching purposes of the Act, presumably expressed in the
Bill of Rights provisions. The states themselves were aware of this fact. See, e.g.,
Brief for State of Conn. as Amicus Curiae at 16, Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (noting the "1 percent" language from H.R. Rep.
94-58).
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within the Court on the eleventh amendment issue.69 In addition, the
Court's decisions are occasionally confusing and inconsistent. For ex-
ample, in Pennhurst I the Court emphasized that the declaration of
rights in the Developmental Disabilities Act was "hortatory, not
mandatory." 70 In Pennhurst II, however, the Court indicated that on
remand the court of appeals might wish to look to that same Act as a
possible basis for relief.7 ' If there had been any reason to believe that
Pennhurst was receiving funds through the Act, then this guidance
might have been warranted. In Pennhurst I, however, the Court
clearly recognized that this was not the case.7 2 More astoundingly, the
plurality opinion in Cleburne characterized the Act as creating a fed-
eral "right to receive 'appropriate treatment, services, and habilita-
tion' in a setting that is 'least restrictive of [their] personal liberty,' "73
a reading that is hardly in keeping with its earlier reticence to find a
"mandate" where Congress had only meant to "encourage."
These and other disagreements with the reasoning of the various
decisions are important. Of far greater significance, however, is what
the decisions appear to be saying about the manner in which large
numbers of our citizens continue to view individuals with mental
retardation.
In a certain sense, the claims presented in each of these cases were
narrow ones, and the resulting opinions-statements to the contrary
notwithstanding-say very little about the rights of citizens with
mental retardation. Pennhurst I & II posed no questions regarding
fundamental rights and expressed no judgments regarding the needs
or characteristics of that institution's residents. In Youngberg, the
substantive liberty interest discerned was tied closely to the particular
facts of the case, and the standard for assessing state actions spoke
expressly in terms of striking balances for the purposes of determin-
ing professional liability. Even in Cleburne, within which the Court
found state actions predicated upon "irrational prejudices," the Court
clung to the particular record before it, and "avoid[ed] making unnec-
essarily broad constitutional judgments."74
This is not to say that the Court has been silent in this regard.
There is some room to believe that it is basically in accord with those
69. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 126-67 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
70. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
71. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984).
72. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) ("Because
Pennhurst does not receive federal funds under the Act, it is arguably not a 'pro-
gram assisted.' ").
73. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3256 (1985) (quoting
42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1) & (2) (1982)) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 3258.
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who challenge many of the more odious state practices that precipi-
tated these lawsuits. In O'Connor,75Youngberg, and now Cleburne,
the Court has recognized rights that the states had persistently, even
adamantly, refused to protect. And, as the Court stressed repeatedly,
it clearly believed that "'[c]onditions at Pennhurst are not only dan-
gerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff
members, but also inadequate for the "habilitation" of the re-
tarded."' 76 Arguably then, the Court has abandoned the prejudices
and fears that impelled Justice Holmes to issue his now discredited
proclamation that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."77
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to believe that the
Court is deeply troubled by the claims raised in these cases, and that
its unease is predicated upon a continuing inability to reach beyond
labels and assess claims raised by citizens with mental retardation as
questions involving the rights of coequal citizens. Cleburne in particu-
lar appears to perpetuate the assumption that it is permissible and ap-
propriate for the state to draw broad distinctions between individuals
with mental retardation and "normal" citizens. The plurality opinion
made it clear that it was not reaching the underlying and far more
troubling question, "whether the special use permit provision is
facially invalid where the mentally retarded are involved." 78  Even
Justice Marshall, who spoke eloquently of the plight of citizens with
mental retardation, nevertheless intimated that a "narrow sub-class"
of these individuals might be excluded from the community
altogether.79
If and when the Court does directly address these issues, it will be
forced to confront a question that permeates each of its decisions to
date: is the Court's overall position regarding the rights of citizens
with mental retardation consonant with the protections that this na-
tion generally extends to vulnerable or disadvantaged segments of its
population? A strong case can be made that the treatment of these
individuals is in keeping with pervasive social views, but is at the same
time at odds with the manner in which the Court has historically as-
sessed "artificial and invidious constraint[s] on human potential and
freedom."8 0
A close reading of the Pennhurst trilogy and Cleburne suggests
75. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). For a brief treatment of this case, see
infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
76. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1984) (quoting
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981)).
77. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
78. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1985).
79. Id. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
80. Id. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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that there were two principal reasons for the Court's holdings. The
first is the traditional doctrine that "[a]s a general matter, a State is
under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those
within its border."8 ' Under this approach, the refusal of a state to of-
fer anything other than safe confinement-and of the Court to order
more-reflects deference to the State's "considerable discretion in de-
termining the nature and scope of its responsibilities."8 2
If-as the state of Pennsylvania asserted in Youngberg-the choice
is simply between limited state actions designed to keep citizens with
mental retardation from "freezing and starving," or no state action at
all,83 then the Court's reliance upon this now overworked doctrine
might make limited sense. The difficulty is that almost all levels of
government now promise far more than just a safe place to live. State
legislatures and state executives routinely espouse higher purposes
when they fashion programs and services for citizens with mental re-
tardation. For example, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made
clear in In re Schmidt,84 the legislature in that state has declared that
"[ilt is the policy of the Commonwealth... to seek to assure the avail-
ability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill .... and
in every case, the least restrictions consistent with adequate treatment
shall be employed."8 5 This broad declaration of purpose is (perhaps)
susceptible to the sort of narrow parsing that some courts have given
the Youngberg "professional judgment" doctrine. Standing on its
own, however, it articulates a positive state commitment that tracks
closely the language employed by numerous federal courts as they
fashioned sweeping substantive rights.8 6
Pennhurst I, of course, instructs that the federal courts are power-
less when claims of state mistreatment are predicated upon state stat-
utes. In defending its holding, the majority in that case argued that
81. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 318 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977)).
82. Id.
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(state should not be "faced with choice" between "habilitation" and "simply
act[ing] to prevent the mentally retarded who are unable to care from themselves
from freezing or starving to death").
84. 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981). The Schmidt case provided the underpinnings for
the court of appeals holding in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), the decision reversed in Pennhurst II.
85. In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 92 n.2, 429 A.2d 631, 634 n.2 (1981) (quoting Mental
Health Procedures Act, 50 PA. CoNs. STAT. 7102 (Supp. 1980-81)).
86. A typical formulation of the constitutional right to treatment states, for example,
that "'a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does
have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."' O'Connor v. Don-




"[t]o the extent there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a
case of the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises."8 7 The
end result is clearly anomalous, for even as it stressed that chronic
refusals by state officials to fund institutions adequately had created
"widespread deplorable conditions," the Pennhurst II majority never-
theless concluded that the responsibility to correct these conditions
"rested on the State itself."88
The resulting dilemma for citizens with mental retardation and
their advocates is both elegant and insoluble. They may petition the
same state officials who have to date refused to act, a course of action
unlikely to produce satisfying results.89 Or they may turn to the
courts, only to learn that (according to the Pennhurst II majority) sov-
ereign immunity had not been waived.90 If sovereign immunity is in-
deed a "fiction... that never properly stands in the way of ultimate
vindication of the rights of the individual against the state,"91 then the
lesson of the cases arising from Pennhurst is clear: try as they might,
citizens with mental retardation challenging their conditions of con-
finement will find no meaningful redress in federal court.
The emphasis here is clearly on redress that will be meaningful.
Even O'Connor v. Donaldson, arguably the most positive of the
87. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 108-09 (1984) (foot-
note omitted).
88. Id. at 108 n.16 (emphasis in original). In a comment that carries interesting impli-
cations in light of Youngberg's "professional judgment" standard, the Court also
noted that "[i]t is not easy to persuade competent people to work in these institu-
tions, particularly well-trained professionals." Id.
89. The Permhurst litigation provides a perfect example of this. At various points in
time, the state of Pennsylvania was found to be in violation of the federal consti-
tution, various federal statutes, and various state statutes. At no point was the
state's conduct found to be consistent with the applicable legal standards. Yet,
each time the state appealed and contested vigorously its obligation to act in the
manner that its own laws and the laws of the land required. See generally Hald-
erman v. Permhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (gen-
eral overview of the case to the point at which the final settlement agreement
was approved). The treatment of the state law issue is particularly revealing.
State law claims were raised in Pennhurst I, but because the Court found its
parsing of the Developmental Disabilities Act dispositive, it did not reach them.
It is worth noting, however, that in its brief the state simply asserted that "state
law provides no right to treatment to the mentally retarded." Brief for Petition-
ers at 39-43, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
The eleventh amendment was never mentioned, and it was only after the state
lost (yet again) on remand in the court of appeals that it rose up in righteous
indignation to assert that a federal court could not impose upon it the duty to
obey its own laws.
90. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103 n.12 (1984). Pro-
fessor Shapiro argues that the Court was incorrect both as to its theory of waiver
and the precise state of the doctrine at the time that the Pennhurst suit was filed.
Shapiro, supra note 45, at 76-78.
91. Shapiro, supra note 45, at 85.
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Court's decisions in the area of institutional treatment, conveys the
sense of a Court avoiding the real issues and charting the least difficult
course in a case in which the state's actions were totally indefensible.
O'Connor dealt with issues arising from mental illness, rather than
the presence of mental retardation. The manner in which the Court
disposed of the case is, nevertheless, consistent with its approach in
the Pennhurst and Cleburne cases.
Kenneth Donaldson was committed for treatment, but received
only "milieu therapy," a euphemism for custodial care.92 Each time he
fulfilled the conditions set for his release the institutional staff found
new reasons to keep him confined. Dr. O'Connor defended his actions
on the grounds that state law "authorized indefinite custodial confine-
ment of the 'sick,' even if they were not given treatment and their
release could harm no one."93 Since the jury found that "none of the
... grounds for continued confinement was present,"9 4 the Court de-
clared that "the difficult issues of constitutional law . . . are not
presented by this case in its present posture."95 Accordingly, it simply
declared that Donaldson's "right to freedom" had been violated,96 and
held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members
or friends."97 Thus, as was the case in the Pennhurst decisions, the
broad question of how this nation should deal with institutional abuse
and neglect was eschewed in favor of a narrow rule tied to particular
facts and circumstances.
All of this suggests that there is a second factor at work in these
cases, one that flows from the nature of the citizens seeking protec-
tion. Simply put, these individuals are "retarded"; they cannot be
"cured," and no amount of "therapeutic" intervention will alter their
basic condition.9 8 Thus, in the Pennhurst trilogy and in Cleburne
92. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569 (1975).
93. Id. at 570.
94. Id. at 574.
95. Id. at 573.
96. Id. at 576.
97. Id.
98. The notion that mental retardation is a disease and that a "medical model"
should be employed is professionally outmoded but remains, socially pervasive.
See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300,
1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (mental retardation "no longer regarded as a disease, cura-
ble or otherwise"; "medical model of treatment by passive care is generally being
replaced.., by the developmental model"). Some professionals in the area are
now seeking a "cure." See, e.g., CURATIVE ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION:
BIoMEIcAL AND BEHAVIORAL ADvANcEs (F. Menolascino, R. Neman & J. Stark
eds. 1983). This is a quest permeated by good intentions that, nevertheless, runs
the risk of reviving unfortunate stereotypes.
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there seems to be an implicit belief that citizens with mental retarda-
tion are not and perhaps can never be "equal."
This is in keeping with a national fixation on intelligence quotients
and with the pervasive-but false-assumption that individuals with
"profound" or "severe" retardation have no hope for meaningful
life.99 The Youngberg Court stressed, for example, that Nicholas Ro-
meo had "the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child, with an I.Q.
between 8 and 10,"100 and that "[r]espondent, in light of the severe
character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will
make possible his release."o1 Noting that "[p]rofessionals in the ha-
bilitation of the mentally retarded disagree strongly on the question
whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded indi-
viduals is even possible,"102 the Court defended its refusal to address
the broader claims raised in the case by declaring that "there certainly
is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appro-
priate professionals in making such decisions." 10 3
There are at least two things wrong with this approach. The first
and most obvious is that the Court has clearly not so circumscribed its
discretion in other contexts. Numerous cases involving other disad-
vantaged groups provide evidence that the Court believed itself better
qualified to make binding determinations when "communal bonds are
adamantly denied."10 4 For example, footnote eleven in Brown re-
flected a considered judgment that it was both necessary and appropri-
ate for the Court to sanction a particular professional judgment.105
Similarly, in Frontiero v. RichardsonO6 the plurality turned to social
science evidence to bolster its judgment that the "immutable charac-
teristic" of sex could not justify invidious discrimination. 07
Clearly, state imposed distinctions based upon race and sex have
provoked the Court into both the recognition that there has been im-
permissible discrimination and the imposition of positive modes of
conduct that clearly impinge upon the "considered discretion" of the
99. See infra text accompanying notes 166-205.
100. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982).
101. Id. at 317. There is some dispute about whether the Court correctly characterized
the position taken before the Court. See Dinerstein, supra note 6, at 693 ("Coun-
sel's concession that he was not challenging the commitment power ... is not
equivalent to conceding that his client was too disabled to be released.") (citation
omitted). There is no dispute that Nicholas Romeo was eventually placed in a
community program. See Brief of Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens at 9 n.*, Hald-
erman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564 & 78-1602 (3d
Cir., on remand from Supreme Court).
102. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 n.20 (1982).
103. Id. at 322-23.
104. Burt, supra note 56, at 463.
105. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
106. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
107. Id. at 686. For a sampling of the sources employed, see id. at 685 n.15.
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states.10 8 In the apportionment decisions,1 0 9 the initial education
cases,11 0 and in particular the busing cases,1 1 constitutional violations
led to Court-imposed actions. The education cases are especially re-
vealing. It was, for example, not enough for the state to simply pro-
vide black children with an educational environment within which
they received "personalized instruction... with sufficient supportive
services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction .... ,"112 A
school was not just a building, education not mere "exposure." Chil-
dren by their very nature required an environment that offered
more.
11 3
Frontiero, of course, recognized that characteristics such as "intel-
ligence or physical disability" were "nonsuspect."114 It differentiated
108. Many of these precedents were promulgated by the Warren Court, and the cur-
rent Court has proven less willing to preserve, much less expand individual
rights. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), with Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). In many in-
stances, the Court has been pressed toward these rulings by the current
administration. As Professor Days notes, "in the face of a national consensus to
eliminate discrimination ... the Reagan Administration has inadequately en-
forced and otherwise undermined, if not violated outright, settled law in the field
of civil rights." Days, supra note 4, at 309. A number of scholars have, however,
argued that the record of the Burger Court is not as bad as some might have us
believe. In certain instances, the Burger Court has stood firm and even altered
prior rulings of its own that were protective of state rights. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), revtg National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For an overview of the Burger Court's work,
see THE BURGER COURT. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed.
1983).
109. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
110. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (compelling reopening
of public schools closed to avoid desegregation). Although the Court moved
slowly, it ultimately imposed positive obligations on state officials. Compare
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (postponing decision as to
how desegregation was to be accomplished), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (proceed with "all deliberate speed"), with Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1970) ("The burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realis-
tically to work now.").
111. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See
generally B. SCHWARTZ, SwANN's WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASES AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1986).
112. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982). In
Rowley, the Court construed the "free appropriate public education" provisions of
20 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1982). It held that the requirement to provide "related serv-
ices," id. at § 1401(17), did not include a sign-language interpreter for a deaf child.
113. Compare Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (stat-
ute merely guarantees "access" to education), with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.").
114. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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between these factors and sex, however, because "the sex characteris-
tic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society."115 The evil thus wrought was to "invidiously relegat[e] the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members."116 By way of contrast,
the C7eburne Court appeared to believe that certain restrictions on the
rights of citizens with mental retardation were permissible precisely
because retardation had a bearing on actual capabilities.317 Unfortu-
nately, as the Court's treatment of Nicholas Romeo reveals, its ap-
proach to these cases is colored by its willingness to extrapolate legal
doctrines from simplistic diagnostic labels. As will become evident,
this propensity to rely upon a classification system based on intelli-
gence quotients wreaks the same havoc upon citizens with mental re-
tardation that sexual classifications once imposed on women: labels
are exalted at the expense of individual rights and needs.118
Even if this were not the case, however, the inconsistencies in the
Court's approach become particularly evident when the C7eburne
analysis regarding suspect class status is examined closely. As the
eburne dissent makes clear, the Court has "never before treated an
equal protection challenge to a statute on an as applied basis. When
statutes rest on impermissibly overbroad generalizations, our cases
have invalidated the presumption on its face."119 The willingness of
the Court to do so in a case involving the rights of citizens with mental
retardation thus apparently reflects a belief that this particular group
merits the creation of a unique analytic framework.
As indicated, the Ceburne Court basically argued that citizens
with mental retardation were not politically powerless, and that some
distinctions between these individuals and "normal" citizens were use-
ful. It posited four reasons for doing so. The first, that "substantive"
judicial judgments should be avoided where the classification deals
with mental retardation, was clearly repudiated by its own holding
that the Court must act in the face of the community's "irrational
115. Id. (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 687.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79 and infra note 164.
118. One of the common habits of courts is to note the IQ of a retarded citizen and
then translate that into a statement that this individual is the functional
equivalent of a child of age X. In almost every institutional rights case, the resi-
dents are described exclusively in terms of IQ and corresponding "level of retar-
dation." See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239, 1242 (2d Cir. 1984). This was the manner in which the Court described
Nicholas Romeo, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. See generally S.
GOULD, supra note 19, at 146-233.
119. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3274 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
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prejudice."120 The second and third rationales were in essence varia-
tions on the same theme: legislative enactments demonstrated that cit-
izens with mental retardation were no longer the victims of prejudice,
and had the power to protect themselves. As Justice Marshall
stressed, however, "[t]he Court... has never suggested that race-based
classifications become any less suspect once extensive legislation has
been enacted on the subject."2-2 1 Finally, the Court argued that it
would be difficult to draw distinctions between a "suspect" class of
citizens with mental retardation and "other groups" that might have
similar claims. The Court was "reluctant to set out on that course,"'122
and declined to do so. That is clearly its prerogative. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to understand how the fact that others might also be the
victims of prejudice justifies denying judicial protections to the group
whose claims are actually before the Court. It stretches the imagina-
tion to believe that the Court would have reached a similar result if
this same argument had been advanced to deny suspect status to
blacks.
The point is not that citizens with mental retardation are not in
some ways "different." They are, and there are undoubtedly some in-
dividuals with mental retardation who can never lead a meaningful
life, at least as the majority of our citizenry might define it. The prob-
lem, of course, is that the Court should not tolerate the segregation of
any citizens, or a denial of their rights, simply because the majority is
ill-disposed toward them.12 3 The results are even more insidious
when one realizes that the courts seem to focus almost exclusively on
IQ, and that decisions predicated on the capabilities of the "profoundly
retarded" deny basic rights to all institutional residents.124 Cases of
120. Id. at 3260.
121. Id. at 3269 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
122. Id. at 3258.
123. See generally Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect The Substantive
Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983); Burt, supra note 56;
Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and
Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 482,574 (1984) ("Liberty is not
protected... [nor] procedural values... served" by a doctrine with "its striking
resemblance to the right-privilege doctrine and its deferential attitude toward
states' rights").
124. The Youngberg Court held that "[r]espondent thus enjoys constitutionally pro-
tected interests," Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (emphasis added),
and made it clear that the decision was tied closely to the particular facts of the
case. Id. at 319 & 319 n.25. One court, while acknowledging that the "Youngberg
... Court recognized that it is not feasible to specify the type of training for every
case," still found "principles that are broad enough to govern diverse factual situ-
ations." Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 374 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied sub
nom. Kirk v. Thomas S., 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986). The court also acknowledged that
Youngberg was an action for damages, but dismissed that factor, stating "[tihe
principles undergirding the Court's decision in the action for damages afford a
1986]
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this sort are seldom crystal-clear: reaching agreement regarding the
appropriate course of action for particular individuals with severe or
profound mental retardation is often difficult if not impossible. But
what is it about these particular citizens that justifies the belief that
the decision of a professional or a parent is presumptively correct and
immune from judicial scrutiny? As Judge Winter observed in dissent
in the "Baby Jane Doe" case, "[a] judgment not to perform certain
surgery because a person is black is not a bona fide medical judg-
ment.... A denial of medical treatment to an infant because the in-
fant is black is not legitimated by parental consent."125
Admittedly, the Court has indicated that it will defer to profes-
sional judgments in other contexts. Prison officialsl 26 and the mili-
tary,127 for example, are given considerable leeway in the exercise of
their discretion. But those cases involve the "rights" of individuals
who have made deliberate choices and were responsible for at least
initiating the situations within which they found themselves: con-
victed criminals have (hopefully) commited crimes, and in the post-
draft era everyone enlists. This is clearly not the situation when
courts examine distinctions predicated upon race, sex, or the presence
of a disabling condition. Within these particular subsets of society,
however, it appears that professional and parental decisions will prove
determinative only as to citizens with mental retardation. What we
must now determine is why this is the case, and whether this studied
deference is justified.
III. LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALS:
STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND
The judicial response to the Court's holdings in the retardation
cases has been mixed,12 8 with parsing of Youngberg in particular hay-
sound foundation for the exercise of equitable powers to fashion remedial, pro-
spective relief." Id. (citation omitted).
125. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d
144, 162 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting), affd sub nom. Bowen v. American
Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
126. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085 (1986) ("wide-ranging deference"
to judgments of prison administrators). But see id at 1090 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (substantial expert testimony regarding prison officials' actions created fac-
tual issue).
127. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986) ("courts must give
great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning
the relative importance of a particular military interest"). It is worth noting that
both "professional judgment" and "parental opposition" were determinative fac-
tors when the Court invalidated the Baby Doe regulations. See Bowen v. Ameri-
can Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2115 (1986).
128. Compare Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986) (state assertion of
minimally adequate treatment not supported by record; community foster care or
group home placement order affirmed), and Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684,
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ing been anything but an exercise in clarity.12 9 Under normal circum-
stances, this would be perhaps both expected and appropriate. The
judicial slate in this area was, however, far from clean. Before
Youngberg, citizens with mental retardation and their advocates
achieved almost universal acceptance of their claims to broad constitu-
tional and statutory entitlements.130 Accordingly, the recurring fail-
ure of previously sympathetic courts to invalidate or otherwise restrict
state practices is cause for substantial alarm. This becomes particu-
larly evident when one examines carefully the manner in which the
courts have characterized citizens with retardation, and in particular
the realities that underly the "states' rights" issues and "professional
disagreements" that have (at least in theory) driven the Court away
from any definitive pronouncements in this area.
The problems that have arisen as a result of the Court's actions are
starkly illustrated in the ironically titled case of Society for Good Will
to Retarded Children v. Cuomo.13 1 Society for Good Will was a class
action brought on behalf of the residents of the Suffolk Developmen-
tal Center (SDC), a state operated "school" on Long Island for citizens
with mental retardation. In a broadly framed complaint, the plaintiffs
sought to improve conditions at SDC, expand community resources
and support services for citizens with mental retardation and their
families, and transfer most of the individuals at the Center to small
community residences.132 In its careful and exhaustively detailed
opinion, the district court determined that conditions at the Center
were "harmful to many of the residents,"133 and that "staffing and
other factors endemic to the management of a large facility make it an
environment that fails to protect the safety of its residents, to prevent
their regression, and to provide an opportunity to acquire those skills
705-06, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (no dispute regarding proper treatment, which had
been denied; community placement ordered), with Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d
365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) (Youngberg requires only "minimally adequate training as
is reasonable in light of... interest in freedom of movement"; no right to commu-
nity placement), and Doe by Roe v. Gaughan, 617 F. Supp. 1477, 1487 (D. Mass.
1985) ("no obligation to institute treatment or training which is unlikely to im-
prove ... ability to function free from seclusion and restraint").
129. In Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983), for example, a badly divided court
issued four opinions, none of which commanded a majority and each of which
adopted a somewhat different view of Youngberg.
130. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
131. 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. It is important to note that the claim was never that all of the institution's resi-
dents were to be placed in less restrictive environments. The rights asserted
were, in this context, not absolute. Individuals characteristics and needs were to
be considered.
133. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1351
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). The district court also issued an initial memorandum and order.
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
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requisite to self protection and development." 134
Accordingly, the court fashioned relief on the assumption that it
must both protect the residents at the Center and, ultimately, through
"habilitation," 35 provide a means by which these individuals might
eventually be placed in less restrictive environments. Mindful of the
fact that the Supreme Court had itself "not decide[d] whether the Due
Process Clause embraces a general right to habilitation,"1 3 s the court
attempted to bolster its opinion by stating that "[i]n the case before us
we need not find any abstract constitutional right to a least restrictive
environment. That entitlement is accepted and professionally re-
quired by the testimony and is implied in the explicit right to care and
treatment provided by state law."137
The court of appeals did not agree.13 8 It accepted the conclusion
that conditions at the Center violated the rights of the residents, find-
ing that "[i]t cannot be disputed that SDC residents have a constitu-
tional right to adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care."13 9
The court also determined that the residents "are entitled to safe con-
ditions and freedom from undue restraint."140 The panel believed,
however, that "we may not look to whether the trial testimony estab-
lished the superiority of a 'least restrictive environment' in general or
of community placement in particular. Instead, we may rule only on
whether a decision to keep residents at SDC is a rational decision
based on professional judgment." 141 Because the Supreme Court had
not expressly acknowledged a right to habilitation and placement in
the least restrictive environment, and because "[e]xperts appear to dis-
agree on the appropriateness of institutionalization and we cannot say
that it is professionally unacceptable, 142 the residents of SDC were
granted only limited relief. New York was obliged to keep these indi-
134. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1351
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
135. "Habilitation" is a term of art in this area. As the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion notes, "[t]he word 'habilitation,' rather than 'treatment,' is commonly used to
refer to programs for the mentally-retarded because mental retardation is consid-
ered to be essentially a learning disability and training impairment rather than
an illness.... [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon training and develop-
ment of needed skills." Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 4
n.1, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
136. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1347
(E.D.N.Y. 1347).
137. Id. As the court of appeals subsequently noted when it remanded this case, the
district court spoke of state law claims prior to Pennhurst II.
138. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir.
1984).
139. Id. at 1243.
140. Id. at 1245 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 1249.
142. Id. For a discussion of the extent to which the court was correct regarding the
expert "disagreements" in the case, see infra text accompanying notes 161-62.
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viduals safe and free from restraint, but it neither needed to improve
their skills nor offer them a prospect of life outside the confines of the
Center.
The court apparently believed that it was constrained by
Youngberg to ask only whether there was "a rational decision based
on professional judgment,"143 and felt that it could assess only the con-
stitutionality of the conditions at the Center. Anything more, and in
particular a claim that residents should receive habilitation and even-
tual placement, went too far:
We do not find a due process right to a specific type of treatment or training
beyond that geared toward safeguarding basic liberty interests. The Due Pro-
cess Clause only forbids deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
Where the state does not provide treatment designed to improve a mentally
retarded individual's condition, it deprives the individual of nothing guaran-
teed by the Constitution; it simply fails to grant a benefit of optimal treatment
that it is under no constitutional obligation to grant.1 4 4
This position can be made consistent with Youngberg only by ig-
noring the Court's emphasis on the facts of that case and, in particular,
disregarding its fixation on professional liability. As indicated, the
Youngberg Court actually did not go that far. Deeply troubled by the
liability issue, it stated expressly that it was assessing the constitution-
ality of the conditions in one institution as they pertained to one indi-
vidual.145 The Court refused to proceed further, and in particular did
not explore the question of a positive right to habilitation. This hardly
constituted a definitive rejection of that doctrine, especially in light of
the reservations expressed in Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion.1 46
The willingness of lower courts to read Youngberg so broadly re-
sults from numerous factors. Perhaps the most important is the need
to preserve a facade of civility, even as the courts attempt to compel
recalcitrant states to live up to their promises to provide treatment
and habilitation. This is not a recent phenomenon. The Pennhurst
litigation in particular provides an example of protracted state resis-
tence to institutional reform litigation, even in the face of conditions
143. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir.
1984).
144. Id. at 1250.
145. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. But cf Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781
F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir. 1986) (Youngberg principles have broad applicability).
146. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325-29 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(arguing Court has left unresolved questions posed where total failure to treat
and where resident loses basic self-care skills). But see id. at 329-31 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (would hold flatly that there is no constitutional right to treatment
or habilitation per se); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-88 (1975) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring) (refusing to equate "right not to be confined without due
process of law with a constitutional right to treatment") (emphasis in original).
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and practices that it cannot or will not defend.147 Nor is this uncom-
mon. State and local officials, their protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding, have frequently displayed at best an ambivalence to-
ward citizens with mental retardation, and have exhibited a pervasive
reluctance to make hard choices when the rights and even the lives of
these individuals are at stake. Indeed, many federal court decisions
protecting the rights of disabled citizens have been criticized severely
by state and local officials. Judge Johnson in Alabama, for example,
was excoriated for his "activist" posture in the Wyatt litigation. He
defended his actions by stressing that "when a state fails to meet con-
stitutionally mandated requirements, it is the solemn duty of the
courts to assure compliance with the Constitution."148 He also pro-
vided a series of telling observations on state claims that inhumane
conditions result from a dearth of funds rather than a lack of good
faith, noting, among other things, state prison purchases of caviar to
entertain legislators and of geldings for breeding purposes. 149
Nevertheless, the courts continue to indulge state declarations of
good faith and limited resources. The prefatory language employed by
the court of appeals in Society for Good Will provides a perfect exam-
ple of this. In the court's estimation, that case focused upon the
welfare of a few of the more than seven million retarded individuals in this
country. It also concerns the constitutional powers and constraints of federal
courts that are asked to grant relief when state political branches of govern-
ment are perceived as too slow in improving individual welfare.... While the
changes embodied in the district court's decree may be commendable, we hold
that some of those changes were requested of the wrong branch of govern-
ment and some of them are beyond the court's constitutional power to
order.1 5
0
The true implications of this studied deference to the state political
branches becomes apparent when one looks at the manner in which
state officials have responded to the odious choices "imposed" by lim-
ited budgets. There is a substantial body of authority that suggests
that a lack of funds will not excuse a violation of constitutional
147. A full history of the Pennhurst litigation is beyond the scope of this Article, but
as indicated, see supra note 89, the state vigorously contested the suit throughout
and was at various times held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with
then binding orders.
148. Johnson, supra note 8, at 915.
149. Id. at 913. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (concluding that judicial involvement is appropriate
and workable); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 78 COLuM. L. REv. 784, 929 (1978) (federal courts "not well suited for
the design and implementation of institutional reform," but "absent legislative or
administrative action, the identification of system wide violations of federal rights
may require the involvement of federal courts in system wide reform").
150. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1242 (2d Cir.
1984).
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rights.' 5 ' In spite of this, states routinely raise the question of funding
as an objection to meeting the obligations imposed if the rights as-
serted are vindicated by the courts. In Pennhurst II, eleven states ob-
served pointedly that "[t]he fiscal implications of the Third Circuit's
decision on the states are of great concern to Amici."152 The courts
seem willing to either accept these "reservations" at face value, or,
when pressed, to confront them only indirectly, if at all. In Society for
Good Will, for example, Judge Weinstein took great pains to stress
the "substantial efforts on behalf of these disabled people [that] re-
mind us that ours is fundamentally a compassionate and caring com-
munity."53 At the same time, he made it clear-albeit inferentially-
that the record in that case did not support these declarations, at least
insofar as the compassion upon which the judge focused was that evi-
denced by New York's elected and appointed officials. Judge Wein-
stein cited data indicating that community care was less expensive
than continued institutionalization.54 More significantly, the record
indicated that New York essentially provided no funds for in home
placements, 5 5 and that it had not exploited federal options providing
substantial matching funds supporting placement in less restrictive
residential environments.156
151. See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300,
1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing cases). Commentators are fond of noting that it was
Judge, now Justice Blackmun, who wrote in Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968), that "[h]umane considerations and constitutional requirements are
not, in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations." Id. at 580.
The intent was, in many if not all instances, to "twist the tail" of one half of the
'7Minnesota Twins." Justice Blackmun's "evolution" as a jurist, see, e.g.,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325-29 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring), ren-
ders this device unnecessary.
152. Brief of States of Ill., N.H., La., Ohio, S.D., Wash., W. Va., Neb., N.J., Tenn. &
Minn. as Amici Curiae 38, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451
U.S. 1 (1981). In some instances, these concerns may be legitimate and extend
beyond simple political convenience. Substantial legal issues are raised when the
federal courts require state legislative and executive entities to allocate their
funds in particular ways. See generally Frug, supra note 9; Hirschhorn, Where
the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunc-
tions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1984); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change:
Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265.
153. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1302
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
154. Id. at 1339 (per annum costs from high of $53,200 in state institutions to low of
$14,200 in family care homes).
155. Id. at 1337 ("the state provides almost no funds to maintain clients in their own
homes").
156. Id. at 1337 (state had not applied for funds under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) waiver that
would provide 50% federal funding match for community services). The same is
true in Nebraska, which has applied for the Title XIX waiver, but has not em-
ployed it. Interview with David Powell, Exec. Dir., Neb. Ass'n Retarded Citizens
(May, 1986). In spite of having perhaps the most sophisticated system of commu-
nity programs in the world, Nebraska continues to invest heavily in institutional
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Of course, the fact that a state refuses to pursue policy choices that
make economic sense is of no independent legal significance. The
Constitution does not guarantee that elected officials will be intelli-
gent stewards of the public fisc. Nevertheless, state choices are mat-
ters for judicial scrutiny when they impinge on individual rights. In
Society for Good Will, the "right" in question was one of community
placement.57 Utilizing the Youngberg professional judgment stan-
dard as a substantive rule of law, the court of appeals found no such
right. The court acknowledged that "'all experts, both defendants'
and plaintiffs', agreed that many clients... could be safer, happier and
more productive outside the institution in small community resi-
dences.' ,158 It believed, however, that Youngberg "did not hold that
constitutional norms are to be determined by the 'professional judg-
ment' of experts at trial. Rather, it held that constitutional standards
are met when the professional who made a decision exercised 'profes-
sional judgment' at the time the decision was made."15 9
This implies that any professional decision is valid, even though all
experts subsequently disagree with it. Youngberg, of course, did not
establish "absolute professional immunity"; the Court expressly de-
clared that expert testimony was in fact "relevant to whether... deci-
sions were a substantial departure from the requisite professional
judgment."60 Moreover, it is difficult to see how decisions with which
"all" experts disagree-even those mustered by the state-can be any-
thing other than a "substantial departure." In an attempt to find sol-
ace, the Society for Good Will panel cited the testimony of one
individual.161 How this solitary opinion became a refutation of "all
experts" regarding the needs and interests of the specific residents of
SDC is a mystery. Certainly, the court provided no justification for
this calculus, and while it probably did not know this, the individual's
own staff, in another context, apparently disagreed with his
conclusion.162
options that are substantially more expensive than community placements. Id.
The problem, according to Mr. Powell, is that if appropriate client movement
were allowed, the institutions would eventually collapse under their own eco-
nomic weight.
157. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1347
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (all residents referred for community placement; failure to pro-
vide "precludes exercise of basic liberties").
158. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp.
1300, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
159. Id. at 1248.
160. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.31 (1982).
161. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (1984)
(citing testimony of Dr. Hugh Sage). Dr. Sage is the Director of the Beatrice
State Developmental Center (BSDC) in Nebraska.
162. One of the impediments to community placement frequently cited in Nebraska is
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Society for Good Will, therefore, clearly frames the division of
opinion between those who harbor a limited estimation of the skills
and abilities of citizens with severe and profound retardation, and
those who believe that a more expansive view is warranted. The de-
bate is a long-standing one, and the courts have come down on both
sides of the issue.163 In theory, the courts have consistently adhered to
the general proposition that they will negate only "unprincipled" de-
nials of the basic rights of citizens with mental retardation.164 For ex-
ample, in Cleburne all of the Justices reserved judgment on whether it
would be permissible for a state or locality to discriminate against a
particular "sub-class" of citizens with mental retardation. This ap-
pears consistent with the general rule that a classification will be sus-
tained if it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."65 In
many instances, however, the superficial appeal of the classification
scheme is belied by reality, and one group of individuals-those soci-
ety has historically labeled as "severely" or "profoundly" retarded-
has been placed in great jeopardy by these recent decisions.
The typical image of an individual with profound retardation is one
of a person for whom
there will rarely be any intelligible speech even at adulthood except for a few
individuals who may say "mama" or "da-da "... Often, sensory defects, skele-
tal anomalies, or other disabilities co-exist in profoundly retarded persons....
Therefore, total life support is essential to their survival, and up to 40% of the
profoundly retarded are either bedfast or semi-ambulatory .... 166
Such an individual is, according to this school of thought, so "defec-
tive" that if "[]eft to his own resources, even in a grocery store, the
"complex medical needs." But "of the approximately 325 BSDC... clients identi-
fied with special medical needs, in the opinion of the BSDC medical stoff only 8
require intense medical services not typically provided in the [state community]
residential programs." ToucHE Ross & CO., STATE OF NEBRASKA COST STUDY OF
THE COMMUNITY BASED MENTAL RETARDATION REGIONS AND THE BEATRICE
STATE DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER 41 (1980) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
TOucHE-Ross STUDY], quoted in Brief of the Nat'l Center for Law and the Handi-
capped as Amicus Curiae at 26, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter N.C.L.H. Brief].
163. Compare Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318
(E.D. Pa. 1977 ("minimally adequate habilitation cannot be provided in an institu-
tion such as Pennhurst"), with Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1247 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Youngberg in no way suggests that
mere residence in a school for the mentally retarded violates constitutional
rights").
164. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3262 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Restrictions on... right to drive cars or to operate
hazardous equipment might well seem rational even though they [deprive] em-
ployment opportunities and the kind of freedom of travel enjoyed by other
citizens.").
165. Id. at 3254 (citations omitted).
166. C. CLELAND, THE PROFOUNDLY MENTALLY RETARDED 3 (1979), quoted in C.A.R.
Brief, supra note 16, at 5.
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profoundly retarded person dies within a matter of days of starvation
if he does not meet with accidental death before that."167
These characterizations are predicated on an inappropriate classifi-
cation system and the implications that flow from them are, in large
part, incorrect. Knowledgeable professionals have long since aban-
doned reliance upon IQ as a single or determinative factor in fashion-
ing appropriate programs for individuals with retardation.16 8 Rather,
they now employ a variety of measures that more accurately reflect
both the true characteristics and actual needs of the individual. In Ne-
braska, for instance, individuals in the community based programs are
classified as "high," "moderate," or "low" need, an approach that more
truly gauges individual skills.' 69 Level of retardation is still consid-
ered. It is, however, only one of at least ten different classification
factors that include negative and positive behaviors, physical needs
and characteristics, and self-help skills. 70
The importance of this development is illustrated by the record in
many states, which indicates that even citizens with severe or
profound mental retardation can develop their adaptive skills and live
either in the community or in environments that closely approximate
a normal residential setting.17' These are not new developments, and
this information has been made available to the courts. For example,
in an amicus curiae brief filed in Pennhurst I it was noted that
recent data support the assertion that there are cost-efficient, community
based, culturally normative alternatives ... [and] that large numbers of indi-
viduals have been placed in them over the past 10 years. Success of the place-
ment was seen to depend primarily on the quality of the community support
system rather than on characteristics of the individuals themselves .... There
appears to be very little empirical support for restricting placement on the
basis of age or IQ, except that demands for community service and environ-
mental supports appear to correlate with these variables.
1 7 2
The closely related argument that medical complications preclude
placement in less restrictive settings is equally unavailing. A state
commissioned study in Nebraska noted that "of the approximately 335
[Beatrice State Developmental Center] clients identified with special
167. Bowman, Neglect of the Profoundly Retarded, reprinted in 11 P.C.M.R. MESSAGE
2 (1968), quoted in C.A.R. Brief, supra note 16, at 5.
168. See generally N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162.
169. See generally Schalock & Keith, An Empirical Approach to Assessing High Need
Clients in Nebraska's Community Based Mental Retardation Programs (1983)
(unpublished paper). The system was formally adopted for use in Nebraska's
community programs by the Regional Directors Council in April, 1983.
170. Id.
171. See generally N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162, at 19-30 (extensive documentation
of developmental potential of severely and profoundly retarded individuals, and
of successful community placements of them).
172. Id. at 24 (quoting Heal, Sigelman & Switsky, Research on Community Residential
Alternatives for the Mentally Retarded, in 9 INTERNATIONAL REvIEW OF RE-
SEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 209, 243 (N. Ellis ed. 1978)).
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medical needs, in the opinion of the BSDC medical staff only 8 require
intense medical services not typically provided in the [community
based mental retardation] residential programs."173 In a similar vein,
a detailed study of programs in Michigan revealed that sixty percent
of the persons in group homes and community residences were citi-
zens with severe or profound mental retardation, and that seventy
percent of this population had serious secondary handicaps or were
medically fragile.174 Even in Pennsylvania, the home state of Penn-
hurst, the service system is predicated upon the assumption that com-
munity living arrangement programs are "structured to meet the
needs of all mentally retarded individuals, no matter what the... se-
verity of handicap."175
In the face of this and other evidence that even the most "fragile"
citizens with retardation can be placed in least restrictive environ-
ments, proponents of institutional care commonly raise three objec-
tions. The first is the simple assertion that citizens with severe and
profound retardation simply cannot survive without the "total life
support" found in institutions.176 The tenacity with which this posi-
tion is advanced is intriguing. For example, in 1978 the Partlow Re-
view' Committee, a group of professionals who had surveyed that
institution for the state of Alabama in connection with the Wyatt liti-
gation,177 argued that "[r]esidents who fail to improve with extensive
education and training efforts will not be subjected to further training
or education per se."178 Instead, they would "receive a full program of
enriching activities ... ."179 The suggestion was, however, summarily
rejected:
The evidence does not persuade the Court, however, that the minimum consti-
tutional standards should be modified to allow defendants to cease providing
habilitation programming and to provide instead an "enriched environment."
The constitutional right of each resident to a habilitation program which will
maximize his human abilities and enhance his ability to cope with his environ-
ment would be threatened by this modification proposed by defendants. The
Court will therefore deny defendants' motion to modify the 1972 order in this
respect. 18 0
173. TOUCHE-Ross STuDY, supra note 162, at 41 (emphasis added).
174. Provencal, The Macomb-Oakland Regional Center, in ToWARD EXCELLENCE:
AcHmvEEMENTs IN REsIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS wiTH DisABIrrms 19, 25,
40 (Apolloni, Cappuccilli & Cooke eds. 1980) [hereinafter TOwARD EXCELLENCE],
quoted in N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162, at 27.
175. Knowlton, The Pennsylvania System, in TOwARD EXCELLENCE, supra note 163, at
127, 132, quoted in N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162, at 28.
176. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
177. See supra note 8.
178. Petitioner's Motion for Modification, Wyatt v. Ireland, Civ. No. 3195-N (N.D. Ala.
1978), reprinted in Ellis, The Partlow Case: A Reply to Dr. Roos, 5 LAW & PSY-
CHOLOGY REV. 15, 37 (1979).
179. Id.
180. Wyatt v. Ireland, Civ. No. 3195-N, slip op. at 10 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1979 (mem.)).
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Judge Johnson's affirmation of his original findings did not, how-
ever, end the matter. The debate over the Partlow Committee's rec-
ommendations continued both in the literature and the professional
community. The Committee's position was, for instance, correctly
characterized as declaring in effect that "some mentally retarded citi-
zens are subtrainable and hence need to reside in enriched institu-
tional settings for the rest of their lives," an "archaic [posture]
contradicted by major ideological and programmatic developments of
the last two decades."s1 These critics were from Nebraska, and cited
extensive data regarding both actual placements in Nebraska and the
substantially lower costs associated with community living arrange-
ments.182 In response, the Partlow Committee declared that
[s]elective demonstrations do not constitute generalizable research. Most
would agree that community living is desirable, especially for higher level cli-
ents, but this is a matter of faith, not research. As for the severely/profoundly
mentally retarded being successfully served in the community, it would be
more accurate to say that some are seemingly being well served in the
community.
1 8 3
This desire to elevate "research" over "faith" is (perhaps) academi-
cally commendable. The findings in Nebraska, at least as presented at
that time, may not have constituted scientific research. They were,
nevertheless, demonstrable facts. The record clearly indicated that
large numbers of citizens with severe and profound mental retarda-
tion were living in the community, and that the medical staff of Ne-
braska's only state institution believed that only eight of the
institution's residents could not have their medical needs met in the
community. The Partlow Committee did not find these realities per-
suasive. This might, under normal circumstances, have been dis-
missed as a somewhat petty internecine dispute. But the argument
was not confined to the dry pages of academic or professional journals.
It has clearly spilled over into the courts,1 8 4 and the Partlow Commit-
tee's statements have caused certain groups to limit their efforts on
behalf of citizens with mental retardation.1 8 5
Fortunately, subsequent research in Nebraska and Pennsylvania
now provides compelling evidence that many of the Partlow Commit-
181. Menolascino & McGee, The New Institutions: Last Ditch Arguments, 19 MENTAL
RETARDATION 215, 219 (1981) (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 217, 219 (extensive community placements with per annum costs of $8,000
in community programs compared to $23,000 in state institution).
183. Ellis, Balla, Estes, Warren, Meyers, Hollis, Isaacson, Palk & Siegel, Common
Sense in the Habilitation of Mentally Retarded Persons: A Reply to Menolascino
and McGee, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 221, 224 (1981) (emphasis in original).
184. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 142.
185. See, e.g., Roos, Custodial Care for the "Subtrainable"--Revisiting an Old Myth, 5
LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 1, 3 (1979) (withdrawal of one professional organization
as amicus in Wyatt and "reassessment" of its role by another "directly related to
the [Partlow] Committee's report").
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tee's basic tenets are incorrect. For instance, one member of the Part-
low Committee noted that for Partlow residents "[o]ne comparison of
adaptive behavior scores on a representative sample of clients over a
one-year period found no significant change; actually, the later scores
were slightly lower."' 86 Since this was "research," the findings, ac-
cording to the logic of the Committee, merit the utmost respect. The
message that this evidence conveys, however, is at odds with the direc-
tion in which the Partlow Committee wishes the courts to proceed.
These findings were from an institution that was "in substantial and
serious noncompliance with... orders" to provide "adequate habilita-
tion programming" and "[sufficiently] trained staff."187 In a more re-
cent study, longitudinal comparisons were made between individuals
in Nebraska's community programs and those residing at an institu-
tion with "strong capabilities in staff development and programming
[and] a sophisticated system of daily training and data collection."188
The study concluded that "the trend toward increased functioning
level in the community is clear." 8 9 More importantly, it indicated
"the likelihood of a decline in functioning level over time in the insti-
tution." 90 The population surveyed included individuals with severe
and profound mental retardation, with the data showing both an in-
crease in functioning level and that "greater needs should dictate
smaller settings in which effective training, environmental stimula-
tion, and life-style management can be ensured."19 1 In a similar vein,
detailed studies of former residents of Pennhurst demonstrate that
they "have made significant behavioral strides while in the commu-
nity,"192 a development that "stands in stark contrast to the finding in
this record that an overwhelming number of the retarded at Penn-
hurst experienced a regression in life skills while at the institu-
tion."1 93  Clearly, "scientific research" has now verified what
professionals in Nebraska, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and other states
already knew: labels should not dictate placement, and the skills of
individuals with severe or profound mental retardation both improve
186. Ellis, supra note 178, at 19.
187. Wyatt v. Ireland, Civ. No. 3195-N, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1979 (mem.)).
188. Keith & Ferdinand, Changes in Levels of Mental Retardation" A Comparison of
Institutional and Community Populations, 9 T.A.S.H. J. 26, 29 (1984). (T.A.S.H.
is the professional journal of the Association for the Severely Handicapped).
189. Id. at 28.
190. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
191. Id. (emphasis in original). The authors stressed that where proper programming
is present, the "goal of keeping virtually all members of future generations in
their home communities is not only possible, but is also likely to be effective in
enhancing their intellectual and social capabilities." Id.




and do so at a higher rate when quality community programming is
provided.
The second common justification for institutionalization is that
while "a small group home for six retarded persons can be a pleasant
family-like place .... it can also be a ghetto, where handicapped per-
sons live out their lives without the necessary special services and
without the sympathy of their neighbors."1 94 This simply points out,
however, that bad services are bad, and good services are good. Cer-
tainly, the same individuals that advance this argument would dispute
vigorously an anti-institution posture predicated upon the Supreme
Court's pointed observation that institutions like Pennhurst are "not
only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged
by staff members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the re-
tarded."195 Indeed, at least one member of the Partlow Committee
visited Pennhurst during the pendency of the lawsuit and declared
that while "it is entirely possible that a particular facility... might be
so inadequate in terms of quality of care that it should be closed ......
Pennhurst is a "generally adequate facility" whose closure he would
not recommend.19 6 Thus, a member of the Partlow Committee found
himself in the anomylous position of defending an institution that the
state, as part of the final settlement agreement, agreed to close.197
The final major argument in favor of institutions is simply that
many of them are "good places to live." One rather idyllic description
stressed that
[a]mong the activities that were introduced were such things as developing a
garden plot, raising plants in the building, playing shuffleboard and pool, set-
ting up large rolls of paper across dayroom walls for coloring and art work,
going for walks in small groups, going fishing at a nearby stream, riding bi-
cycles, repairing furniture, polishing stones, and even such things as taking
groups of residents out of doors late at night to observe the sky and to see
what the world looks like to normal persons who are free and able anytime to
walk out of doors and see the sky and the stars. Likewise, we have introduced
boy-girl activities, dances, parties, and boys and girls going on walks together
accompanied by staff.1 9 8
This is perhaps the most difficult of the pro-institution arguments
to deal with. Without a doubt, some institutions are safe and clean,
and many institutional staffs make good-faith attempts to provide an
environment conducive to individual growth and habilitation. Never-
194. Egg-Benes, supra note 17, at 352.
195. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1984) (quoting
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981)).
196. Balla, Evaluation of Pennhurst Center 7 (n.d.) (emphasis in original).
197. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
198. Kreger, Compensatory Environment Programming for the Severely Retarded Be-
haviorally Disturbed, 10 MENTAL RETARDATION 29, 30 (1971), quoted in C.A.R.
Brief, supra note 16, at 12.
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theless, as a general matter, the very idea of an institution should
strike us as antithetical to our basic beliefs, assuming of course that we
attribute to citizens with retardation those characteristics that are
commonly associated with membership in the human race. In almost
any context other than services for individuals with mental retarda-
tion, the dominant belief is that "[i]nstitutionalization is contrary to
the American value system.... The family is viewed as a primary
socializing agent, and the removal of a member of the family to an
institution means that the individual will cease to function as a socio-
logical member of the family."199
More significantly, "generalizable research" indicates that even
good institutions may cause the skills of their residents to regress, 2 00
and that even when skills increase in institutions, the rate of increase
is higher for individuals in the community.201 This evidence is partic-
ularly important in light of Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
Youngberg, which stresses that
[i]f a person could demonstrate that he entered a state institution with mini-
mal self-care skills, but lost those skills after commitment because of the
State's unreasonable refusal to provide him training, then, it seems to me, he
has alleged a loss of liberty quite distinct from--and as serious as-the loss of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. 2 02
Justice Blackmun did not address directly the independent question of
community placement, and he would continue to "defer to the judg-
ment of professionals as to whether or not, and to what extent, institu-
tional training would preserve... pre-existing skills."203 Neverthless,
the Court was apparently mistaken both as to Nicholas Romeo's
claims and his ability to be placed in the community,204 and acknowl-
edged that professional judgments may indeed be balanced.205 Since
substantial evidence exists documenting the fact that those regarded
as having "severe" or "profound" retardation can benefit from habili-
tation, and indeed will often achieve more substantial gains in commu-
nity settings, continued adherence to many of the underlying
rationales in the Pennhurst cases and Cleburne makes little sense.
Accepting all of this as true, at least for the sake of argument, why
is it then that many cling so stubbornly to a medical-institutional
model when assessing the needs and rights of citizens with retarda-
tion? The answer seems relatively simple: certain parents, profes-
199. CaNN, DREW & LOGAN, MENTAL RETARDATION: A LIFE CYCLE APPROACH (n.p.)
(2d ed. 1979), quoted in N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162, at 18.
200. See, e.g., Keith & Ferndinand, supra note 188.
201. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F.Supp. 1221, 1232-33
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
202. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 328 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 328-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
204. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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sionals, government officials, lawyers, and judges simply do not
believe that citizens with retardation are human beings who merit our
assistance and, when necessary, the protection of our laws. The fact
that Judge Harold Stump would authorize the secret sterilization of
Linda Sparkman, who was allegedly only "somewhat retarded,"
speaks volumes about the continuing prevalence of stereotypes and
mistaken beliefs in our society.20 6 Hopefully, these attitudes are
slowly being eradicated. But the musings of the Partlow Committee,
and the argument that an individual with profound retardation would
die if left on his own in a grocery store, demonstrate that attitudes not
far removed from those of the eugenicists remain with us.
The Court, of course, is aware of these facts. In Pennhurst I, one
group of "concerned" parents contended that "there is nothing about
institutions which makes them inherently incompatible with the con-
cept of 'normal' life for the retarded."207 The group conceded that
community living arrangements were appropriate for "some" individ-
uals.208 It argued strenuously, however, that those individuals classi-
fied as having "severe" or "profound" mental retardation could not
and should not be placed in the community, and bolstered its case with
selections from the "professional" literature.209 These views would,
under the Youngberg rationale, be deemed "presumptively valid." In
that same case, however, the Court was provided with extensive infor-
mation indicating that the traditional classification schemes are out-
moded and that less restrictive placements are both the preferred
professional approach and entirely appropriate for even the most com-
plicated cases.210
The information presented to the Pennhurst Court was strikingly
similar to that proferred in Brown and Frontiero, in which stereotypes
were assessed and rejected. Nevertheless, in Pennhurst I the Court
focused on the narrow question of the true force of the "rights" em-
bodied in the Developmental Disabilities Act, and avoided the broader
question of whether institutions in and of themselves are unconstitu-
tional. In a similar vein, it refused in Youngberg to address the real
issues, even as it formulated a standard that some parties now use in
their attempts to shield state actions from judicial scrutiny. Clearly,
the Court's continuing struggle to identify the narrowest possible
grounds for each of its decisions in this area is the product of calcu-
lated assessment rather than ignorance or naivete.
206. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
207. C.A.R. Brief, supra note 17, at 12,
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 4-6. The Brief quoted, for example, the characterizations of citizens with
severe or profound mental retardation advanced by Cleland, supra text accompa-
nying note 166, and Bowman, supra text accompanying note 167.
210. See generally N.C.L.H. Brief, supra note 162.
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As a result, we are left with cases like Society for Good Will, in
which the "expert" testimony so important for the Second Circuit was
provided by an individual whose own staff apparently disagreed with
his judgments. More importantly, in that case the district court estab-
lished clearly that reliance upon cost considerations-a cornerstone of
the states' rights perspective-was illusory. Presumably then, until
the Court tells us otherwise, under the logic of the Parham,11
Youngberg, and Pennhurst II, demonstrably incorrect professional as-
sessments and illogical, even illegal state actions are "presumptively
valid" and immune from federal judicial scrutiny. This would occur in
spite of the fact that in many instances both professionals and parents
espouse positions that make a mockery of the Court's assumption that
it is appropriate to defer to their judgments, and that subsequent
events have demonstrated that individuals like Nicholas Romeo can be
placed successfully in a less restrictive community residence.212
The problems faced by many parents of citizens with mental retar-
dation are real,213 and the debate within the professional community
regarding appropriate placement of citizens with mental retardation is
intense. But the Court in these cases seems to have gone to extraordi-
nary lengths to preserve parental prerogatives and professional judg-
ments, often at the expense of individual rights.214 Obviously, where
appropriate community services are not available, placement simply
for its own sake should not occur. Where adequate, and often even
superior options are present, however, continued adherence to outmo-
ded beliefs makes little sense.
The ultimate irony is that a change in posture by the Court may
ultimately prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. As Professor Burt notes:
These cases appear to reflect a wish on the part of normal people to dissociate
themselves from retarded people, and thus they also mirror the emergence of
so-called "white backlash" since Brown. But more than this, the Court's ma-
jorities in these cases repeatedly rely on a constitutional norm of "state auton-
omy." The invocation of that norm signifies the rising dominance of narrowly
individualistic, secessionist impulses for all manner of social relations.2 15
The Court has not, of course, declared that citizens with mental
retardation are not to be treated "equally" with others who are "simi-
larly situated." A convincing case can be made, however, that "[e]qual
211. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See infra note 214.
212. See supra note 101.
213. See generally Frohboese & Sales, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization.
A Challenge in Need of Attention and Resolution, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1980).
214. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (parents with "plenary authority
to seek [commitment], subject to a physician's independent... judgment").
215. Burt, supra note 56, at 460. Professor Burt observes that "[the deeper question
[in cases regarding retarded people] is whether there is any continuing obligation
on so-called 'normal' people to listen and respond to the claims of retarded peo-
ple, and thereby to acknowledge at least this much shared humanity." Id. at 490.
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protection must have substantive content."2 1 6 Characterized as an
"equality of respect interpretation of equal protection," this approach
stresses three objectives:
First, the state must recognize the fundamental nature of people's right to
participate in a political process that chooses and attempts to implement the
group's conception of the good society-a political participation principle. Sec-
ond, the state must not pursue purposes, and the political process must not
further individuals' preferences, to subordinate or to denigrate the inherent
worth of any category of citizens. Third, the state must guarantee to everyone
those resources and opportunities that the existing community treats as neces-
sary for full life and participation in that community.2 1 7
The Pennhurst trilogy and Cleburne are arguably consistent with the
first principle.218 But the lurking sense within the decisions that citi-
zens with mental retardation are second-class citizens violates the sec-
ond, and the failure to guarantee more than simple maintenance care
in an institutional setting shatters the third. It is then one thing to
argue that citizens with mental retardation merit the same constitu-
tional protections as other disadvantaged groups. It is clearly quite
another to believe that society will eventually respond with under-
standing, much less acceptance.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article in no way exhausts the complex legal and social issues
that arise when federal courts assess the needs and interests of citi-
zens with mental retardation, and in particular when these same
courts require state executive and legislative entities to allocate their
tax funds in particular ways. It is not a definitive treatise on the na-
ture of those conditions we have come to characterize as "mental re-
tardation," or on the proper means for a caring society to respond to
the needs of citizens with what we should now recognize as unfortu-
nate but by no means crippling limitations. Rather, my purpose has
been to question the logic of continued adherence to outmoded beliefs,
and in particular to challenge rote acceptance by the federal courts of
both false images of citizens with mental retardation and disengenu-
ous state explanations regarding the manner in which they "treat"
these individuals. Sixty years ago, Justice Holmes used Buck v. Bell to
"thr[o]w the authority of the Court and the morality of patriotism be-
hind his appeal, legitimating race- and class-based fears as well as the
policy those fears generated."2 19 Hopefully, the Court will never
216. Baker, supra note 123, at 933.
217. Id. at 959 (footnote omitted).
218. But see Comment, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center- Equal Protection
for the Mentally Retarded?, 9 HARV. J.L. & POL'Y 231, 242 (1986) ("growing belief
that society should create exceptions to [equal protection] for members of disad-
vantaged groups suffering from mental and physical handicaps").
219. Dudziak, supra note 20, at 865.
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again go so far. Accordingly, it is now incumbent upon us to see that
such false impressions rest forever in the past, consigned to those de-
cades where ignorance and fear, rather than factual inquiry and true
compassion, ruled the day.
The conclusion is inescapable that many attorneys and the judges
before whom they practice remain mesmerized by our national fixa-
tion on IQ as an indicator of human worth, and are paralyzed by a
Supreme Court no longer willing to ask "but is it right." As a result,
there is reason to believe that courts are "running from that part of
themselves which suggest[s] a common identity with handicapped peo-
ple."2 20 There was a time when the Court appeared to be willing to do
more, even for those citizens with mental disabilities. Unfortunately,
the Court's attitude appears to be changing. Perhaps those Justices
who have fashioned these more recent decisions truly believe that the
Constitution so dictates. However, unless and until the Court con-
fronts directly the issues it has so assiduously avoided, it is just as rea-
sonable to believe that it is either reflecting or responding to a
hostility toward citizens with mental retardation that is perhaps more
subtle than that enshrined in Buck v. Bell, but no less insidious.
If the purpose of the law is to shield society from unpleasant indi-
viduals and uncomfortable decisions, then there is some room to argue
that these results are justified. If, however, our ultimate objective is
to retain the law as a touchstone for human decency and as a moral
force, then we have lost a great deal, and in return have gained very
little.
Mark 1. Killenbeck; '87
220. Burt, supra note 56, at 494.
